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RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHIE. Unter Mitwirkung des Verfassers aus dem Dänischen
übersetzt von F. Bendixen. Von *Dr. Harald Höffding*. Leipzig: O. R.
Reisland, 1901.

Dr. Harald Höffding, in his *Philosophy of Religion*, claims that all positive religions are untenable, but that the nucleus of religion is worthy as well as capable of preservation. Such is the fundamental idea of a voluminous work elaborated with the now fashionable method of the theorem of the conservation of values: "Satz von der Erhaltung der Werte." Dr. Höffding is well known to our readers as the ethicist of Copenhagen, and his books are distinguished by keen thought and a radical tendency. We would, however, criticise his expression as contradictory; if the positive religions are untenable, we should think their nucleus would be untenable too. If their nucleus is untenable, then there are positive features in the religions which would remain untenable. The difference here is a difference of expression. Dr. Höffding calls the positive element in religions the dogmas which have to be taken on credit, even though they are contradictory to science. To him a religion which is based on ideas which are not in conflict with science seems to be a negative religion; he adopts the word *positive* as used not by Comte but by dogmatists of the Churches, and we think the term would better have been avoided in this connection. What he wished to say might be better expressed thus: That though the dogmatic form of the several religions must be considered untenable, the underlying idea is capable and worthy of preservation; and this underlying idea would be that element of religion which would stand the test in the furnace of scientific criticism.

P. C.

DER STREIT DER PSYCHOLOGISTEN UND FORMALISTEN IN DER MODERNEN LOGIK.
Von *Dr. Melchior Palágyi*. Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann.
1902. Pages, 93.

Whether one agrees or disagrees with the author's conclusions, the survey which Dr. Palágyi has given us of the discussions now being carried on between the psychological and the formalist or mathematical parties in modern logic will be suggestive reading. The author claims that the preponderating interest which was until recently taken in experimental and psychological research is waning, and that the foremost thinkers of to-day are turning their attention with increased zeal-ousness to the questions of logic and epistemology. The pendulum has reached its point of highest psychological elevation, and has at last begun its movement toward the other side. And gratifying as this tendency of the intellectual movement may in some aspects be, it is yet, the author thinks, attended with danger. The "psychological peril," he says, has been replaced by the "formalistic peril"; and it is his mission, therefore, to restore equilibrium.

Dr. Palágyi's discussions are conducted in connection with animadversions on Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, which to him are symptomatic of the present conflict between psychologism and formalism. His criticisms are in one special